Equity Pooling and Media Ownership by Chinloy, Peter
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 51 | Issue 3 Article 3
5-1999
Equity Pooling and Media Ownership
Peter Chinloy
American University
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the Consumer
Protection Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chinloy, Peter (1999) "Equity Pooling and Media Ownership," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 51: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol51/iss3/3
Equity Pooling and Media Ownership
Peter Chinloy*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 557
II. M EDIA OWNERSHIP ...................................................................... 559
I. EQUITY POOLING .......................................................................... 562
IV. MEDIA EQUITY POOLS .................................................................. 565
V . CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 571
APPENDIX: DIVERSIFICATION AND LOCAL RISK .......................... 572
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines methods to increase the diversity of ownership
of media outlets. There are several reasons why public policy might be fo-
cused in this direction. First, the media has a public goods characteristic
where private pricing is not proportional to the benefits obtained by any
one consumer. With high fixed costs and virtually no marginal costs, there
are barriers to entry for capital-constrained entities. Second, the media dis-
seminates education and culture, which are not homogeneous. Third, cor-
porate ownership may target programming and content toward median and
representative consumers, restricting access to a diverse audience.
Technological advances in media have blunted some of these argu-
ments. The free disposal cost and an inability to charge consumers may
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create niche markets that advertisers are willing to support, such as in
"free" newspapers and cable television-both media have targeted minor-
ity audiences. While network television has focused on median consumers,
cable television has adopted a more aggressive, "narrowcasting" format,
and its growth of advertising revenue exceeds that for radio and network
television. These developments do not necessarily diversify the ownership
base for media properties.
This Article offers a proposal for pooling equity for purchase of me-
dia properties. It is based on widespread practices for savings pooling used
in inner city and immigrant communities, but with certain wrinkles that fa-
cilitate securitization, diversification, and increased access. The basis of
the contract is the rotating savings and credit account used to pool savings
to achieve capital accumulation. These accounts provide funds for a down
payment on a house or to buy a small business. Investors combine their
funds into a common pot. Each investor bids for the pot, the winner being
the low bidder.
For media properties, the bidding is for a package of a financial pool
and a management right. A group of investors contributes to a pool of
funds and is concentrated into teams. Each team has the right to bid for
both the pool and the management. The low bidder receives both the pot
and a management right in exchange for offering a larger lump sum to the
unsuccessful bidders. The management right can be resold, allowing a
separation of ownership. The base package provides a preferable alliance
of equity ownership and management.
Only one investor group receives the management right, which is bid
for by surrendering a part of the investment return to the other investors.
Investors who do not manage receive compensation from those who do.
The successful management group has a minimum equity stake in the
business to avoid conflicts between ownership and management. The eq-
uity pool bids consecutively on several properties, allowing diversification
and access to management by several groups. Alternatively, the same
management group can acquire several properties.
The proposal has two principal advantages over tax credits and other
policies targeted at specific media properties. First, the pooling allows in-
vestors to diversify across several properties and markets, reducing the risk
of default and loss of equity. Second, markets are introduced for bidding
on management and programming. Those wishing to have a management
role or to select the content pay for it by compensating other equity hold-
ers. Incentives to dissipate resources are reduced by requiring a manage-
ment entity to have a sizeable stake in the venture.
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Part II of this Article discusses the background for media outlet own-
ership. Part Ill has an analytical structure of media firms, where revenue
comes from national and local advertising. The local station or property's
expenses are paying for the national network feed and local costs. Media
properties that depend on local advertising are particularly vulnerable to
shocks in their domestic markets. Particular media properties that are vul-
nerable in this way are radio stations and "free" throwaway newspapers to
which this proposal is targeted.
The proposal is less relevant in media with a more national focus,
such as cable television and Internet service providers. These latter types
of media can be seen more as content deliverers. Diversification across
markets has a greater benefit in such cases, or at least it is more risky to
promote programs that involve acquisitions of single properties. Part IV
discusses financial data and analyses of media ownership. Diversification
across media properties has benefits tied to the proportion of revenue
coming locally. Part V discusses issues and caveats in implementation.
II. MEDIA OWNERSHIP
Media outlets have the characteristics of a "public good": watching a
television program does not reduce the amount of time that one's neighbor
can watch it. This characteristic makes it difficult to charge each individual
a price for viewing time. Pay-per-view is an alternative only in one-shot
items such as boxing events. In private markets, the price of a good or
service is proportional to the marginal utility or benefit that a consumer re-
ceives. Pricing that service assures its allocation to consumers willing to
pay for it and removes its consumption from those not willing to pay.
None of these concepts applies to media properties. There is no scarcity in
supply, and virtually all of the cost of production is fixed: The marginal
cost of reaching another home with a broadcast signal is virtually zero.
Under these conditions, market pricing equilibria fail, and large-scale enti-
ties charging zero for their service emerge, crowding out smaller firms.
A second issue is that the media disseminate the culture of the soci-
ety. If the outlets are owned by corporate or other entities targeting the
same advertisers, there is a tendency to appeal to the median consumer,
even though that market segment represents a small slice of the overall
population. Television markets focus on women ages eighteen to forty-
nine in their advertising pitch, even though this group is a minority of the
overall population and audience. The target excludes the elderly, minori-
ties, and males ages eighteen to forty-nine. The first two groups have low
propensities to consume, and the last group tends not to watch network
television. Achieving high ratings has traditionally meant targeting median
consumers.
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The targeting of the median consumer and its corresponding neglect
of minorities is no longer a successful strategy, as cable television has
shown. Advertising revenue on cable television has grown more rapidly
than on radio and network television during the 1990s. Network television
now attracts only half of viewers watching the medium, excluding those
who have gravitated to the Internet. Figure 1 shows advertising revenues
for the three types of media outlets.
Figure 1.
Radio, Cable, and Network Television Advertising Expenditures ($ Billion)
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During the 1990s, cable television advertising revenue has grown at a
rate of 12 percent annually, more than double the growth rate of network
television. To the extent that cable emphasizes "narrowcasting" and a tar-
geted audience, the strategy of appealing to median consumers is no longer
necessarily optimal. The problem with cable television is the fixed cost for
entry access onto local cable company lineups. This fixed cost is another
barrier to entry for undercapitalized minority entrepreneurs. Economies of
scale in production, high fixed costs and low variable costs, and the inabil-
ity to charge at the margin have continued to favor concentrated ownership
in media.
The response by the federal government has been to promote diverse
ownership by tax expenditures. Favorable tax treatment is granted to mi-
nority buyers or to the sellers of these buyers. In 1978, the Commission
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adopted the Minority Tax Certificate Program, which gave preferential
treatment in the sale of media companies to minority ownership.' Minori-
ties included African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian and Pacific
Island Americans, Native Americans, and women. If these groups bought
an interest in a media company, the seller received preferential tax treat-
ment on the capital gains. The program was controversial since some rela-
tively affluent owners benefited, and it was repealed in 1995. The pro-
gram has remained under review. William Kennard, the Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, has expressed interest in reintro-
ducing some program to expand minority ownership.3
Minority ownership may offer a different perspective. The content of
the programming might be altered. There is an educational externality for
members of the majority group and educational diffusion for the minorities
themselves. The media represent the culture, and it is advantageous to have
that diffused across the economy. The market expands by having different
types of ownership. The criticism has been that the minority ownership is
concentrated in the hands of a few owners who do not exhibit a broad-
based perspective. Other funding sources have been introduced, such as the
Broadcap Fund, which includes minority media ownership.
Even when minority or other capital-constrained owners are able to
buy a media entity, that holding is concentrated and vulnerable to risks in
the local market. These unsystematic risks are diversifiable by holding a
larger portfolio of several media properties, although most public pro-
grams have been directed toward a single property purchase. This single
property focus increases the risk of default or of the minority owners
serving as a front for more established capital.
Large-scale media companies are able to diversify risk by holding
portfolios of stations across the country. Ownership rules allow media
companies to own up to twelve television stations, allowing CBS, Disney
(ABC), General Electric (NBC), Time-Warner, Fox, and other broadcast-
ers to be largely immune from local risk.
The Minority Tax Certificate Program concentrated on ownership of
one local outlet in one market. The conditions in that market increased the
•4
bankruptcy risk of all investors. There is evidence of low correlations in
1. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Public
Notice, 68 F.C.C.2d 979,42 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1689 (1978).
2. Act of Apr. 11, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 2(a), 109 Stat. 93, repealing 26 U.S.C.
§ 1071.
3. Kennard Suggests New Approach to Tax Certificates, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 12,
1998, at 1.
4. Peter Chinloy & Man Cho, Unlocking House Equity, 14 REAL EsT. FIN. 79, 82
(1998).
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returns on properties across cities within the United States at the same
time, notably in the housing market.5 In the Chinloy and Cho study, the
five largest markets in the United States-New York, Los Angeles, Chi-
cago, San Francisco, and Philadelphia-were examined. The correlation
coefficients in returns to holding a single-family house in these five mar-
kets range between -0.25 and 0.1.6 These are low correlation coefficients,
since individual stocks in the U.S. market frequently have correlations of
0.7 to 0.9. The implication is that a substantial amount of risk across mar-
kets can be removed by being in both markets instead of a single one.7
Large-scale media companies are already aware of this situation and are
diversified across markets.
These correlations ar lower than between stocks and other financial
assets. If returns to radio stations in Buffalo and Chicago behaved identi-
cally, their correlation coefficient is one, and it makes no difference to
hold stakes in both of them. For practical purposes, such as the transaction
costs of the inevitable Kls on income tax returns, monitoring, and fixed
costs, it pays to hold a single asset. If those correlation coefficients are less
than one or even negative, then it pays to hold a diversified portfolio at one
point in time. Targeted programs focusing on acquiring a single property
carry risks without commensurate returns. Given the low correlations
across markets, it is desirable to have a program that allows investors to
• - 8
hold a portfolio of media properties.
III. EQUITY POOLING
While formal financial markets have left minorities behind, there re-
mains an informal sector that provides capital for start-up businesses. The
mechanism is rotating savings and credit accounts. They coexist in the
shadows of sophisticated financial markets, sometimes within a stone's
throw of them.
These informal pools allow individuals to group together to make a
major purchase. Such a system could be applied to the acquisition of media
outlets, which have similar characteristics to houses or local businesses
that the pools often acquire. Concentrating an investment on a single me-
dia outlet or a single house is risky, especially if the investors derive most
5. Id. at 81. Wilson Nelson Goetzmann, The Single Family Home in the Investment
Portfolio, 6 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 201 (1993).
6. Chinloy & Cho, supra note 4, at 82.
7. Goetzmann, supra note 5, at 201.
8. Details on the impact of a concentration on local advertising and the effects of di-
versification on media properties are in the Appendix.
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of their income from the local market by dint of employment or entrepre-
neurial activity.9
In the equity pool, investors are grouped collectively for the purpose
of buying into a portfolio of media properties. Each group bids to receive
an investment return and a management right on a specific property. Bid-
ders bid for the management right by surrendering their investment return.
The low bidder receives the pool of funds and the management right.'0 The
difference between the pool amount and the low bid is a return to the un-
successful bidders.
Each time the pool is formed, all members share in the ownership,
but the low bidder is the sole entity holding the management. Alterna-
tively, the pool takes a minority position in the media outlet and contracts
the management to another source or to a corporate entity. The successful
bidder receives a super share, an above-average equity position. The in-
vestors commit to funding for several rounds until a series of acquisitions
in different markets or with different properties is made.
Existing rotating savings and credit accounts operate in immigrant
and minority communities to pool equity capital. Each member pledges to
pay an amount into a fund, typically a fixed annuity. One member of the
group acts as the banker, collecting and receiving the funds from con-
tributors. 2 Each member or investor receives two rights in exchange for
the continuing investment: a return and a right to the pool. The right to the
pool is determined either by random draw or by bidding. 13 The low bidder
receives the pool, permitting a down payment on a house or starting a
business. Since the low bid is less than the pool contains, the unsuccessful
bidders receive the differential as additional interest.
14
Suppose there are four pool members each contributing $5,000 per
draw for a total of $20,000, and the successful low bidder bids $15,000.
This low bidder receives the funds from the pool and uses them to start a
business or buy a house. The other bidders are co-owners if the asset al-
lows several investors to be on the title. The unsuccessful bidders receive
the remaining $5,000 either as initial interest or as additional equity in the
investment. If this were a house, the homeowner might be assigned less
than 25 percent ownership in exchange for paying the operating expenses.
9. Chinloy & Cho, supra note 4, at 79.
10. Id. at 80.
11. Id. at81.
12. Id. at 82.
13. Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations,
83 AM. ECON. Rev. 792 (1993).
14. Chinloy & Cho, supra note 4, at 82-83.
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The house is usually owned 100 percent by the resident, since mortgage
application guidelines require sources of the down payment to be indicated
and the financial statements of co-owners. The other pool members are un-
secured lenders and equity holders and rely on the informal relations and
structures to ensure repayment with a return.
Equity pools formally securitize informal arrangements where indi-
viduals combine resources to accumulate capital. In immigrant and inner
city communities the practice is widespread, frequently being imported
from societies from which the immigrants came. The Jamaican partner,
Ghanaian susu, 5 and Korean kye are methods by which households save
for a down payment or start a business. Within the Korean community,
dry-cleaning and corner grocery businesses receive initial financing from
kye funding in addition to ongoing support, factoring, credit lines, and
technical expertise. Besley, Coate and Loury, in describing these rotating
savings and credit associations in the African-American community, view
the pools as "a pot of money to which each participating household con-
tributes an annuity."' 16 The households differ by their desire for the capital
in the pool or by their rate of time preference.
7
Equity pools allow minority businesses to become established and
house purchases to be financed. They operate almost entirely off the radar
screen of financial markets for several reasons. The banker is usually re-
luctant to deposit funds for tax and drug identification reasons, leading to
security and theft risks. 8 There is an enforcement problem in requiring
members to continue contributions. 9 If members fail to contribute, the
pool is incomplete, and the pool cannot purchase or continue. The con-
tracts are not secured. If a member who has bought a house fails to main-
tain it or defaults on the mortgage, the pool investors lose their investment.
But perhaps that is the beauty of the program: It survives as virtually the
only formal capital accumulation program in the ghetto.
In inner city and immigrant communities formal financial institutions
typically do not exist. There are frequently no banks or lending entities to
provide debt financing. There are no investment banks, venture or oppor-
tunity funds, even as these self-same entities located a few miles away
scour the world for investment opportunities. There is evidence of a
change. Michael Porter has argued that the inner city is a new frontier for
15. Besley et al., supra note 13, at 792 n.1.
16. Chinloy & Cho, supra note 4, at 80 (citation omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 83.
19. Besley et al., supra note 13, at 794, 805.
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investment opportunities.20 Formal banking firms are purchasing other en-
tities that lend to low and moderate-income households, such as First Un-
ion purchasing the Money Store.21
IV. MEDIA EQurry POOLS
To apply the equity pooling concept to the purchase of media proper-
ties requires modification of existing arrangements. For the media pool,
investors receive a package of two assets: a return and a management right.
They are required to participate in a series of investments, although they
can transfer their slot by sale to another investor.
Each investor puts in a given amount on each call to participate,
analogous to those made by venture capital funds. The investors are
grouped into larger bidding teams, for purposes of bidding on the package
including the management right, to avoid fragmentation of ownership and
management. Investors not wishing any management rights opt out of team
membership. A bidding team for the management right must have a mini-
mum equity position, such as 15 percent. The bid is made by surrendering
some of the cash to other bidders. The successful bidder is given a man-
agement fee capped at 2 percent of revenues.
The pool contributes the equity capital, and other sources of debt and
mezzanine equity contribute the rest. The 15 percent minimum pool size
reduces the incentive conflicts from management holding a small portion
of the equity. These agency conflicts with shareholders come about when
management has a minimal equity stake. The conflicts are reduced by the
pooling and minimum equity requirement. A management with a low eq-
uity stake has incentives to consume perquisites such as travel and enter-
tainment, hiring friends to work at the property, and otherwise dissipating
capital. While these moral hazards exist in any business, if the manage-
ment has a larger stake it dilutes its investment by wasting equity holders'
funds. The equity pooling concept reduces the risk of such expense and re-
source wastage but does not eliminate it.
Unsuccessful bidders receive compensation from successful bidders,
another incentive-compatible feature. The management is paying other
shareholders for the right to manage the property. The management right
could be set for a specific time limit as a further brake on dissipation of re-
sources.
The proposal is an enhancement of existing arrangements. First, the
funds receive a formal equity stake with title to the property. Title in ex-
20. MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPErm ADVANTAGE OFNATIONS 154 (1997).
21. First Union Completes Purchase, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at B5.
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isting equity pools frequently rests with the owner-occupant, and the other
investors have difficulty in proving their ownership. Second, funds are
maintained by a third-party trustee, deposited in a financial institution, and
not held by a member. There are problems with member bankers ab-
sconding with investor funds. Third, the program is familiar to most mi-
nority and immigrant entrepreneurs who are frequently in such arrange-
ments already. Fourth, the minimum equity requirement and cap on
management fees reduces incentives for wastage. Public programs have an
incentive to maximize expenses and no incentive to maximize returns.
As a case study, suppose a radio or television station is being valued
at sixteen times annual cash flow or eight times gross revenue. Gross reve-
nue is $2 million annually, 75 percent coming from local advertising. The
value of the property is $16 million at the eight times gross valuation. The
annual cash flow, or earnings before interest, income taxes, depreciation,
and amortization (EBITDA) is $1 million, and the sixteen times annual
cash flow multiple supports the valuation.
Gross revenue $2,000,000
Operating expenses $1.000.000
Annual cash flow (EBITDA) $1,000,000
The property purchase of $16 million is to be financed with 75 per-
cent debt or $12 million, payable at 8 percent annual interest. The debt
service and interest cost is $960,000, or 8 percent of $12 million. There is
no amortization on the debt.
Annual cash flow (EBITDA) $1,000,000
Debt service cost $ 960.000
Cash flow after debt service $ 40,000
The property is financed with $2.4 million of mezzanine equity, or 15
percent of the total. These investors receive a preferred, priority return,
such as 6 percent of their funds if capital is sufficient, plus 40 percent of
any residual. The $40,000 left over is paid to these investors, entitled to 6
percent of $2.4 million or $144,000, and there is an unpaid return of
$104,000. This transaction leaves a minimal cash return initially, with the
market multiples placing a price on future growth.
The equity pool contributes the remaining $1.6 million of capital.
The summary of the three investors' position is:
Debt: 75 percent of capital investment, 8 percent in-
terest rate;
Mezzanine Equity: 15 percent of capital investment, 10 percent pre-
ferred return, 40 percent ownership;
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Equity: 10 percent of capital investment, no preferred
return, 60 percent ownership plus management.
The management of the property gives an equity participant an opportunity
to disseminate the culture or to provide diversity. Equity holders receive a
package of 60 percent ownership of the property after all others have been
paid and a management right. This management right receives a capped
proportion of gross revenue from the property, such as 2 percent of reve-
nue, but allows the manager control of programming and strategy. The
combination is a valuable right to income and content. It achieves the goal
of diverse management.
A management bid requires a team to have at least 15 percent owner-
ship percentage of the equity and to form a formal entity such as a corpo-
ration, partnership, or trust. The management right has a value to investors
wanting direct content and programming control. Investors not interested
in the management receive compensation in the form of additional debt.
The pool is collateralized at $2 million. The mechanism is for inves-
tors to make contributions, which can be as low as $2,000 or 0.1 percent of
the initial capital requirement. Each investor is assigned to a team. Sub-
groups interested in management find equity investors to contribute to
their team.
As an example, suppose there are four bidding groups, each of which
has a 25 percent ownership stake in the $2 million pool. There are no indi-
vidual investors wanting to remain outside of a team. After $12 million in
debt and $2.4 million in mezzanine equity there is $1.6 million required by
the seller. The capital structure is:
Debt: $12.0 million
Mezzanine Equity: $ 2.4 million
Equity: $ 1.6 million
The low bidder receives the management right. Any residual in the pool
belongs to the unsuccessful bidders.
A low bid of $1.6 million covers the equity and leaves $400,000 in
the pool. This amount is a capital reserve, held as a promissory note pay-
able to the unsuccessful bidders, but a liability of the venture acquiring the
media property. The balance sheet is:
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Assets Liabilities
Cash $ 0.4 million Debt $ 12.0 million
Media Property $ 16.0 million Promissory Note $ 0.4 million
Equity
Mezzanine $ 2.4 million
Investors $ 2.0 million
Total $ 16.4 million Total $ 16.4 million
The promissory note has priority over the mezzanine equity in the balance
sheet. This situation is not a requirement, although it provides an incentive
in initial capital raising. The investment has a debt kicker that encourages
bidding, as a consolation prize for the unsuccessful.
If the low bid is less than $1.6 million, the successful bidder must
place additional capital. A bidder at $1.5 million must invest another
$100,000. All four pools retain ownership based on their contribution to
the original pool, not the bidding process. The only exception is where this
additional capital is contributed. Since the capital pool is now $2.1 million,
the management group is given a share of 6/21 (2/7) of the investor inter-
est. The remaining $500,000 is a promissory note payable to the unsuc-
cessful bidders, so the management investors have bought the right from
the other investors at a premium. The other three investor teams own 5/21
of the 60 percent provided to equity partners.
A bid between $1.6 million and $2 million does not change the bal-
ance sheet. The seller only needs $1.6 million. A successful bidder at $1.8
million pays $1.6 million, but $200,000 is a promissory note to the unsuc-
cessful bidders and the other $200,000 is a promissory note to all bidders,
including the successful ones. The first note has priority over the second to
encourage the management group to keep its capital invested. Each of the
four groups holds 25 percent of the equity portion.
All investors have access to the management right, but the group that
values it most highly is the successful bidder. Investors who want a passive
investment do not bid on the management right and are compensated.
There is a market for management and control offered for sale between
participating equity bidders. Those most desirous of management control
bid lower and compensate the other bidders.
There are other modifications. A separate submarket could develop
for programming and content. A bidding contest for programming and
content can be separated from that for management. There may be spe-
cialized management firms available for radio and television stations that
can be hired on a contract basis. In a radio station case the bidding allows
selection of format and content. The low bidders have control over the
format and programming structure, and the implementation is up to outside
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management. In this way, the cultural and educational benefits are main-
tained; there is diverse ownership, but the management of the properties
takes advantage of economies of scale. The equity position for the mezza-
nine equity capital is open to modification. The investment could elect to
hold only debt and equity, in which case the four pools have a direct own-
ership of 25 percent each.
The successful investor group has effectively contributed $500,000 of
the equity, or 25 percent of the total equity capitalization of $2 million. To
acquire the property alone, even with the same mezzanine and debt fi-
nancing would have required $1.6 million and no capital reserves. The
successful investor team is able to hold a diversified portfolio of proper-
ties. If the investors have access to the full $2 million, they participate in
four rounds of the equity pooling. If there are three other properties avail-
able, they bid at each of the drawings, and if successful, hold the manage-
ment of four media properties. Alternatively, each of the four teams has
access to managing one property, but with diversification reducing the de-
fault risk and the bidding process providing incentives to allocate man-
agement to those willing to compensate others. Figure 2 summarizes the
equity pooling and securitization program.
Combining cable television, radio, and network television, about half
of total broadcast advertising revenue comes from local sources. The mix
of advertising revenue differs by property type. With the fast-growing ca-
ble television medium, advertising is predominantly national. Network
television relies on national advertising at the aggregate level. The net-
works pay the local stations to carry the national programming. The sta-
tions sell local advertising both during certain assigned slots during net-
work prime time and have revenue control outside of prime time. In
exchange, the television stations affiliated with the network must carry the
prime time and other network programming and its national advertising.
Radio has an above-average mix of local advertising, partly because of the
signal limit but also because of fragmented ownership. This unsystematic
risk can be mitigated by diversification across markets and stations.
An issue of late is an upsurge in the demand for radio stations. Apart
from the boom in all assets, physical and hard, the demand growth comes
partly from FCC proposals to ease concentration ownership restrictions on
radio stations. Hicks Muse of Dallas has become the largest radio station
operator in the country. Walt Disney, CBS, Chancellor, Liberty, and the
leveraged buyout firms Hicks Muse and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts have all
recognized not only the diversification benefits but the ability to sell to
national advertisers with a national network. The corollary is any compa-
rable entity may require a presence in several markets.
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Figure 2. Acquisition Structure
Media Ownership and Equity Pooling
I IGoup 3 Gou4
- Successful Bidder
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article outlines an implementable strategy for expanding own-
ership of media properties. The strategy achieves diversification and is in-
centive compatible by establishing bidding markets for management and
content. Diversification reduces the risk of concentrating on one property
and one market. Setting up markets for management, with requirements
that management hold a substantial equity position, reduces tendencies to
maximize expenses and shifts them toward maximizing profits, while at-
taining cultural objectives. Unsuccessful bidders are rewarded with addi-
tional debt position as compensation for surrendering management and
programming control. The structure builds on existing institutions and
formalizes them, notably in equity pooling.
Financial markets have been securitizing both debt and equity con-
tracts. An equity pool has some elements of securitization. Participants are
required to make periodic contributions, not unlike mortgage payments. In
exchange, they receive ownership positions entitling them to cash flows
and bids for management rights. If the capital inflows from contributors
were partly predictable, they could be sold as securities providing lump
sums to investors, as zero-coupon bonds.
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APPENDIX
Diversification and Local Risk
The Appendix discusses how the mixture of local and national adver-
tising affects pricing and how the risk can be diversified. Let c, be the cash
flow or funds from operations per dollar of asset price. The asset price of a
property, such as a radio or television station at time t is P,. The total return
to holding a property is:
(1) rt = P + c,
where p, = (P,+, - P1)/P, is the rate of capital gains or increase in the asset
value of the media property between dates t and t+1. These observations
can be obtained by the price paid for a broadcast property in a given mar-
ket. Since these properties trade infrequently, some adjustment for time
between sales is also needed.
Suppose the market price is a multiple of cash flow, with a common
market-wide multiple A.. The multiple is expressed in total revenue or, in
the case of cable television properties, per subscriber. Cable television
franchises change hands at a price per subscriber, such as $2,500 as a lump
sum. A frequent multiple on small businesses such as radio stations is fif-
teen to sixteen times operating income. Media properties sell at eight to ten
times gross revenue.
From the funds from operations statement, cash flow has two basic
components, a national or economy-wide and a local effect. These are
proxied by national and local advertising net of operating and capital ex-
penses.
A national television network may require a local affiliate to carry
programming and advertising in exchange for a payment, or even require
the payment of licensing fees. At the cable level, ESPN charges cable op-
erators for the right to carry its programming. These costs are chargeable
against national revenue. Most of the local affiliate's costs for rent, labor,
and supplies are purchased in the local real estate and labor markets and
subject to the costs and market conditions there. An exception might be for
news anchors, where the market for such talent is subject to superstar
status, and a local affiliate must pay the national rate.
Cash flow is:
Ct : CL, +CNt
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as a vector across markets, reflecting local L and national N net advertising
revenue. The national revenue exhibits no local component and is not
subject to unsystematic risk. The price of the media property is:
(3) P, =Ac'
where it is common for the multiple to be based on cash flow. Cash flow
for a media property includes the protection afforded by depreciation pro-
visions, such as over the price paid for cable television households. If a
property is traded at eight times annual cash flow, then each dollar of cash
flow yields an eight-dollar asset price.
If this multiple is constant and parametric to the national market, then
substituting the two media-income conditions (2) and (3) in the general
return (1) yields
= (c11 +CN) +CL+ +CN,+l- CD CN, = A(C+CNI)+Z(g 1 +gN,)(4) Ct+CC + M
= (CII + CNt ) + ;,
'L + 
_D+ -Nt+I) -- .
Ct + cN,
This structure means that only the cash flows from local and national
sources of a media property need to be known for two adjacent time peri-
ods, such as years, to determine the return to holding a property. The
growth rate of cash flow from local advertising is g", and that from national
advertising is g,,. These data are readily available for properties and can be
used to determine rates of return for individual properties in local markets.
If there is information on these returns over a period of time in each
property, then there is a group ri, of returns over t = 1, ... . T. The mean
and standard deviation of the returns over the T observations for the ith
property are (ms), and the correlation coefficient between returns in two
different markets is pi. The means over all the properties are m = (m,, ....
,m,), and the variance-covariance matrix V has diagonal elements s. and
off-diagonal elements pissj. The investor is selecting the proportions of its
portfolio w to minimize the risk associated with the variance of returns.
min WTVW
(5) ST wm >m*
w > 0 (no short sale)
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The problem is to select the portfolio allocations w that minimize the
risk subject to the investor obtaining a target return m*. Solving this prob-
lem repeatedly for various values of m* ranging from that on a riskless as-
set such as Treasury bills to a high return of 25 percent yields the mini-
mum risk consistent with that return. The solution is an optimal portfolio
combination of w. If one of the w elements is one and the rest zero, then
the investor puts all eggs in one basket. Since the correlation coefficients
across markets are low, in areas where local advertising is important, there
is a gain to diversification.
As for any investment, the return to holding a media property is the
sum of its income yield and its capital gain. Media companies have im-
portant characteristics of growth stocks. First, they are largely protected
from foreign competition because of cultural content. There are explicit
prohibitions on foreign ownership in some cases, but generally cultural
jobs cannot be easily exported to low-wage locales. There is even evidence
that foreign capital, although mobile across borders, cannot easily mobilize
creative talent. The experience of Sony in making television sets as op-
posed to operating a motion picture studio is a case in point.
Second, media companies have the potential for rapid growth be-
cause of the superstar effect described by Cook and Frank and Rosen.
2
Superstar markets are characterized by low cost of replication and diffu-
sion, a case with broadcast technology. On the demand side, there is lim-
ited substitutability between one talent and another.23 Moreover, there is
bounded rationality, in that consumers only have limited shelf space to
keep track of top talent. With the supply technology expanding and broad-
cast companies controlling the delivery, there are prospects for superstars
and their deliverers to exhibit extremely rapid growth and capture above-
average returns. Over the past two years, the leading sector in total return
performance among publicly traded stocks has been cable television, with
broadcasting second, with annual returns in excess of 60 percent, more
than twice the growth of the benchmark Standard and Poor's 500. An out-
line of the income statement and valuations is below:
22. PHILIP J. COOK & ROBERT H. FRANK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOcIETY (1996);
Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 845 (1981).
23. Rosen, supra note 22, at 847-49.
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Pro Forma Income Statement, Media Property
Revenue
Advertising (Local)
+ Advertising (National)
= Total Revenue
- Operating Expenses (Payroll, Supplies, Rent)
= Operating Income or Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depre-
ciation, and Amortization (EBITDA)
- Capital Expenditures (Equipment, Buildings)
= Funds from Operations: Cash Flow
Asset Values (Selling Prices)
= Gross Revenue Multiple * Total Revenue
= Net Revenue Multiple * EBITDA

